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A Two- Level Account of Executive Authority
M I C H A E L  S K E R K E R
National security programs create challenges for advocates of popular 
sovereignty— the idea that “we the people” broadly, should govern ourselves. In 
a democracy, the people elect officials to govern them and hold these officials ac-
countable, in theory, by monitoring their actions and subjecting the officials to 
regular re- election. Thus, transparency appears to be a precondition for popular 
sovereignty. Alex Guerraro lays out the challenges for this kind of accountability 
in his chapter in this volume, particularly with respect to national security is-
sues. Few citizens know what their officials are doing; the issues at hand are ex-
ceedingly complicated, and in the national security realm, certain deliberations, 
decisions, and actions often have to be kept secret to preserve their efficacy. Thus, 
a paradox:  in a system where the people are sovereign, people elect officials in 
part, to keep them safe; national security actions may require secrecy, but secrecy 
undercuts the legitimacy of government action in a system where the people are 
sovereign. The purpose of this chapter is to determine whether inhabitants of a lib-
eral state— a type of state tracing the legitimacy of its coercive actions to the con-
sent of the governed— also need to know the internal protocols and legal findings 
of the government agencies ostensibly serving them. To put this question another 
way, what, if anything, may government agencies in liberal states keep secret?
This chapter will proceed in four sections. It is first necessary, in Section I, to 
articulate a moral foundation for security operations— law enforcement, military, 
and intelligence operations— conducted by a state domestically and internation-
ally. The argument for grouping these types of operations together is that they 
are all oriented to maintaining a secure and peaceful domestic society. Moreover, 
liberal states divvy up security responsibilities among different agencies in var-
ious ways, so it would not serve the purpose of this chapter to restrict the conver-
sation to one agency or activity. A moral foundation will express the rationale for 
security services such as law enforcement, military, and intelligence agencies to 
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engage in operations. This foundation will also provide a possible justification for 
maintaining secrecy if secrecy is necessary for the success of security operations. 
Section II will ask if public scrutiny of security services is necessary. Section III 
will ask if laypersons are competent to scrutinize the operations of security serv-
ices. After it is determined that public scrutiny is both appropriate and possible, 
Section IV will consider whether and how security services can effectively de-
liver security while also making internal protocols, legal rulings, and operations 
public. I conclude that many types of security operations can survive public dis-
closure at a certain level of generality. A relatively small number of morally per-
missible operations must be kept secret when their disclosure would directly or 
indirectly endanger security personnel or the success of operations.
I. MOR AL FOUNDATIONS FOR SECURITY OPER ATIONS
A. Institutions, Collective Responsibilities, and Professional Duties
The purpose of this section is to develop a moral foundation for a state’s security 
operations. I will initially rely on technical work done by Seumas Miller to ex-
plain the moral foundations of institutions.
Human beings have positive and negative claim- rights by virtue of their nat-
ural properties. These rights impose reciprocal positive and negative duties on 
all others. One person can meet her positive duties toward another by delivering 
morally required goods and services in circumstances when positive rights are apt 
and the duty- bearer is in the morally relevant position to deliver those goods and 
services. For example, many argue that all humans have a positive claim- right to 
the basic goods for a decent life such as food, shelter, and medical care. If this is 
true, it follows that a very poor person without the means of providing for herself 
(perhaps because of disability or scarcity in the local environment) may demand 
assistance from a well- off person with the power to help her. While anyone can de-
mand anything of anyone, the structure of rights suggests that the well- off person 
is duty- bound to positively respond to the poor person’s demand. All humans 
also have negative claim- rights against being murdered, assaulted, robbed, raped, 
deceived, and so on, which all others (not merely those in the patient’s proximity 
or those with certain means) can meet by refraining from such rights violations 
and by protecting her from them.
Individuals also have joint moral rights insofar as they are members of certain 
groups. These are rights that attach to individuals but only as group members: for 
example, a right of national determination or a right to secede. They are based 
on properties individuals have as individuals, such as a right to direct one’s own 
life, as well as on properties they have as group members.1 A joint moral right of 
special relevance to this chapter is the right to security, by which I mean a right 
to live in an environment that is free of rights violations to a degree that people 
are not unduly inhibited from pursuing different personal and joint projects. This 
1. Seumas Miller, The Moral Foundations of Social Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 68.
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right will be unfulfilled in most complex societies absent institutions to deter, in-
vestigate, and punish rights violations as well as a culture (partly shaped by the 
relevant institutions) where most people are disinclined to intentionally commit 
rights violations.
If a person is well- off and can buy the necessities of life for himself, his positive 
right to these goods does not impose duties on others. The fact that everyone, 
well- off and not, needs these goods creates a collective moral responsibility to 
create them.2 Thus, if for example, a group of shipwreck survivors find themselves 
on a deserted island, it is intelligible for them to say “Somebody should go gather 
fruit,” where the “should” has normative, and not just instrumental weight. The 
person engaged in these activities, or in producing such goods in a complex so-
ciety, has a certain moral privilege to her actions, to be further refined below.
The aggregation of individual rights, joint moral rights, and aggregated human 
needs create collective moral responsibilities to protect and address those rights 
and fulfill those needs. Collective moral responsibilities are moral responsibilities 
of groups to attend to these rights and needs because only groups can effec-
tively meet them. Groups are not supra- individuals with special group- sized 
responsibilities. Collective responsibilities attach to individuals but only if they 
are members of certain types of groups.
Typically, these collective moral responsibilities are acquitted by creating and 
supporting institutions to address the relevant rights, such as schools, hospitals, 
businesses, churches, and militaries.3 Governments are meta- institutions tasked 
with coordinating the activities of institutions. These institutions are essentially tel-
eological, set up to foster, create, and protect the collective moral goods (e.g., health, 
education, security) that protect rights and fulfill morally important needs.4
The collective moral responsibility of society is largely, though not completely, 
transferred to the professionals who work in morally vital institutions. For their 
part, laypersons should support the work of these institutions (subject to certain 
limitations, below) by cooperating with institutional actors, obeying relevant 
laws, supporting the institutions though tax payment or charity, and refraining 
from attempts to undermine them. They might also be morally required to di-
rectly assist institutional actors in cases when they cannot cope with exigent 
circumstances, such as helping clean out debris after a natural disaster.
The end of these institutions are collective goods so professionals have a joint 
moral duty to comply with their professional imperatives (a joint moral duty is a 
moral duty to do something that can only be done in a group).5 Thus professional 
imperatives are not simply like the obligations of a member of a club, instrumental 
to the club’s end, but moral duties, with the weight to compete with other moral 
2. Miller, 68.
3. Miller, 57, 77, 80. See also Paul Camenisch, Grounding Professional Ethics in a Pluralistic Society 
(New york: Haven, 1983), 52– 55.
4. Camenish, 54– 55.
5. Miller, 80.
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duties, since they meet others’ positive rights, protect negative rights, and pro-
duce the goods to meet morally important needs.
A professional duty to meet the collective moral right of security is too vague to 
be action- guiding for professionals such as police and service personnel. At first 
blush, we can see that many steps to deliver security could be unacceptable to the 
community supposedly benefited by the state agents, for reasons ranging from 
brutality to ineffectiveness. I propose we take advantage of the criterion of uni-
versalizability inherent in most schemes of rights and duties to further delineate 
relevant professional duties. Since a key component of deontological morality, on 
most construals, is the equality of human persons, one way of working out the 
scope of attendant schemes of rights and duties is through universalization tests. 
In order to identify rights and their scope of legitimate exercise, philosophers im-
agine everyone in the world who is capable of bearing rights as having the pu-
tative right under discussion and potentially planning to act or actually acting 
on the right to the proposed degree. Plans or actions that cannot be logically or 
practically universalized, or rules for actions or permissions to act that cannot 
win actual or theoretical consent by those potentially affected by the action, are 
morally impermissible. Non- universalizable rights- candidates fail and thus lack 
correlative duties.
I propose that the contours of security professionals’ duties to contribute to 
security be specified by imagining the professional behavior winning the uni-
versal, hypothetical consent of all the parties affected by the agents’ action. In 
non- philosophical settings, people invoke hypothetical consent when they con-
sider what an acquaintance or a stranger would find consent- worthy when the 
agent is unable to communicate with the other party. Considerations of what an 
acquaintance would consent to might be based on particular knowledge of the 
person’s preferences. Considerations of the same question in relation to a stranger 
must turn on assumptions about what any person would have rational grounds to 
find worthy of consent. We assume someone experiencing a medical emergency 
would want to be given first aid, we assume someone who has passed out from 
hunger would want to be fed intravenously, we assume someone being attacked 
would want to be defended, and so on. This strategy does not give the agent a 
wide range of action- guiding directives but will be limited to actions geared to-
ward protecting generic human interests or moral qualities. The agent has rational 
grounds to think that anyone would consent to proportionate actions taken to 
save the person’s life, limb, and property and to protect her rights because every 
person has rational grounds to demand and seek the preservation of these interests 
and rights in her own case. An actual person might not want to live, be fed, or have 
anyone harmed on her account but has rational grounds to demand satisfaction 
of ofher rights. She cannot blame a stranger for assuming her desire for rights pro-
tection absent some express sign to the contrary.
Philosophical discussions of hypothetical consent sometimes idealize the 
consenters and/ or the context for consent in order to screen out biases, idio-
syncrasies, and immoral views actual people may have, and nonideal factors 
characterizing actual debate on moral issues such as ignorance, limited time, in-
timidation, and other non- rational group dynamics. These thought experiments 
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are conducted by some in an effort to identify a fundamental framework for all 
of interpersonal morality or for identifying just political institutions. My use of 
hypothetical consent will be less ambitious than both of these projects, using it 
instead to identify the contours of extant professional duties.6 As argued above, 
I agree with Miller that the properly constituted professional duties of morally 
vital institutions are moral duties. Hypothetical consent is one way— not neces-
sarily the only way— of working out the proper constitution of professional duties. 
To be clear, I am not using hypothetical consent to ground professional norms, 
but rather, as a heuristic to work out the unvarying norms entailed by professional 
duty and the derived professional tactics, that vary with context as applications of 
the norms.7 Professional morality is ultimately grounded in the collective moral 
responsibility to protect people’s joint moral rights, aggregated individual rights, 
and aggregated needs.
I will refer to the hypothetical consent of all affected by potential state actions 
below without specifying which social contract school’s notion of consent is 
being invoked: the consent of idealized consenters operating according to ideal 
communication rules, of actual people following ideal communication rules, or 
of actual people unconstrained by ideal communication rules.8 It is appropriate to 
6. I am sympathetic to both projects but lack the space here to work out a full- blown contrac-
tualist theory or refine the political contractualist model I developed in  chapter 2 of An Ethics 
of Interrogation.
7. There is considerable debate in the contractualist literature as to whether hypothetical con-
sent can ground norms. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1978), 37– 53; Jean Hampton, Political Philosophy, (New york: Westview, 1996), 
66; Hannah Pitkin, “Obligation and Consent– II” The American Political Science Review 60.1 
(1966): 3952, 56. Cf. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New york: Columbia University Press, 
1993), 85. For a further overview of standard critiques, see Nicholas Southwood, Contractualism 
and the Foundations of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 135– 137.
8. A significant point of debate in the social contract literature is whether the people the theo-
rist imagines to debate rules governing their future interaction have a certain common moral 
makeup, such as a disposition to find common ground or ignorance about the interests of the 
parties they represent in dialogue. “Contractualists” hold for certain initial moral constraints 
about dialogue while “contractarians” do not place such restrictions on dialogue partners. 
The moral parameters of the contractualists ensures that the ideal dialogue results in moral 
principles, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA:  Belknap Press, 1971), 120. 
Contractualists can be further divided into those who conduct thought experiments involving 
idealized contractors operating according to ideal communication rules and those who argue 
that interpersonal morality is constituted by actual people debating according to ideal com-
munication rules. The former group includes Kant; Rawls; John Harsanyi, “Morality and the 
Theory of Rational Behavior,” in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Amartya Sen and Bernard 
Williams, (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1982); and Thomas Nagel, Equality and 
Partiality (New york: Oxford University Press, 1991). The latter group includes T.E. Scanlon, 
What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1998) and Jürgen Habermas, The 
Theory of Communicative Action (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1985). The benefit of the uncon-
strained nature of the contractarian dialogue is that dialogue partners are imagined to reach 
agreements that are in the parties’ interests to respect regardless of the parties’ level of desire 
to behave morally. Contractarians include Hobbes and David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, 
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refer to even the last type of contract as involving hypothetical consent since the 
relevant theorists anticipate what actual people have rational grounds to endorse 
based on their self- interests. We need to engage in some kind of philosophical 
construct to model what large numbers of people would endorse since referenda 
on professional duties are neither feasible nor necessarily morally salient. The 
duties of security professionals need to be considered in reference to large num-
bers of people— all the people in the world— since service members or intelli-
gence officers’ actions can benefit all the inhabitants of their states and of allied 
states and potentially pose threats to the combatants and noncombatants of any 
state that threatens their state or allies or any state or region hosting irregular 
militants or pirates.
It is gratuitous to devote space here to defending one of the above contractualist 
theories first, because the collective moral responsibility grounds the relevant 
professional norms instead of hypothetical consent, and second, since I suspect9 
all contractual starting points would yield the same results regarding the contours 
of state agents’ duty to facilitate a community’s security.10 A large group of actual 
people unconstrained by communication rules as well as a group of actual people 
so constrained might well endorse the same security- seeking tactics identified by 
the theorist based on a thought experiment involving idealized contractors and 
ideal communication rules since the options for professional duties for police and 
service personnel are fairly limited and the proper choices, whether one engages 
in egalitarian moral reflection or self- interested calculation, clear. Whereas the 
duty to assist the needy, respect people’s privacy, or respect people’s autonomy 
might be executed in many different ways in different contexts, inhibiting con-
sensus on the constitution of such duties, the sorts of options we might put 
before real or idealized consenters regarding security- seeking norms are less nu-
merous and less sensitive to cultural differences. Military norms, for example, 
turn on broad questions designed to produce clear action- guiding norms about 
the use of force such as “May military targets that are not vital to the attacker’s 
strategy be attacked?,” and “May military targets be attacked if there are risks to 
noncombatants?” We can readily predict how idealized or actual people would 
(Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1978); Christopher W. Morris, “A Contractarian Account of 
Moral Justification,” in Moral Knowledge?, ed. Walter Sinnott- Armstrong and Mark Timmons 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 215– 243.
9.  One cannot do more than anticipate what the second type of contracts would yield in its 
Habermasian construal.
10. Miller argues that state agents in democracies should be constrained in their pursuit of col-
lective goods by the community consent embodied in local law, 248. He acknowledges that 
professional duties cannot also be considered moral duties if there are gaps between law and 
common morality. Therefore, I think that hypothetical consent does not suffer in a comparison 
with a reference to extant law as a moral guide, since Miller has to invoke idealized democratic 
law anyway to explain how institutional duties are also moral duties. Miller also refers to the 
teleological end of the institution to give content to professional norms guiding their behavior 
in areas left unspecified by law. My model provides state agents with a specific model for deter-
mining the parameters of their professional duty.
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respond to questions involving their physical safety and so will not expect gaps 
between the anticipated consensus of a large group of people unconstrained 
by communication rules, people bound by egalitarian communication rules, 
and idealized consenters whose hypothetical consent is based on axiomatic 
preferences for the full enjoyment of their rights, and the like.
B. The Security Standard
Hypothetical consent can be used to expose the contours of professional norms 
and tactics by way of a formal framework I call the security standard.11 The frame-
work can be used to expose the contours of the professional norms of all the mor-
ally vital institutions, but I will here focus on governmental institutions tasked 
with maintaining the security of the state. Since government measures taken to 
protect people from rights violations usually include types of coercion, there is a 
risk that measures aimed at protecting innocent people will also violate those per-
sons’ rights. It therefore will not suffice simply to say that all protective actions by 
security services are permitted.
The security standard endorses norms and tactics. Within the professions, 
professional norms are general rules for institutional actors that are largely rule- 
consequentialist in their logic. The norms lead to the morally vital collective goods 
the institutions are designed to meet when all or most institutional actors adhere 
to the norms. Norms are morally rich as they deal directly with core human rights 
or moral goods. They are general, capacious, and communicative to practitioners 
and outsiders of the values of the profession.
Tactics are instrumental applications of norms and unlike norms, can vary with 
context. For example, the military norm of discrimination might lead to military 
units choosing lighter munitions or prohibiting indirect fire when confronting 
insurgents in densely populated areas. Discriminate tactics will depend on the 
physical environment, available technology, enemy behavior, and the like. Viewed 
the other way, the underlying and unifying principle of conscientiously chosen 
tactics is expressed in a norm. I will only focus on tactics in this chapter.
The security standard is composed of two major rules for picking tactics— 
two rules for expressing the contours of security- seeking state agents’ profes-
sional duty. First, we can see that a rule would win the consent of all affected that 
directed state agents to adhere to tactics reliably, efficaciously, proportionally, and 
efficiently leading to the institutions’ goals of security instead of tactics unreli-
ably, inefficaciously, disproportionately, and inefficiently doing the same. Since 
security- oriented tactics ranking favorably in these four practical categories may 
infringe on people’s rights, we can imagine consent accruing to a second rule 
11. I apply the security standard to police tactics in An Ethics of Interrogation, chs. 2– 3, 5 and to 
intelligence collection tactics in “Moral Concerns with Cyberespionage,” in Binary Bullets, ed. 
Bradley Strawser, Fritz Allhoff, and Adam Henschke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 
251– 276; “Intelligence Ethics and Non- coercive Interrogation,” Defense Intelligence Journal, 16.1 
(2007): 61– 76.
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selecting the most rights- respecting among the most reliable, efficacious, propor-
tional, and efficient tactics.
With these two rules, the security standard endorses tactics surviving a three- 
stage winnowing process. The standard (1) canvases locally available tactics aimed 
at meeting the joint moral right of security; (2) isolates the most reliable, efficacious, 
proportional, and efficient tactics; and (3)  endorses the most rights- respecting 
among the tactics meeting the practical metrics of (2). The practical elements of 
(2) are aimed at achieving the collective good of security while the deontological 
element of (3) acts as a brake, excluding practically effective tactics that come at too 
high a moral cost. Essentially, the security standard is a way of balancing affected 
parties’ interests in the effective and efficient delivery of certain collective moral 
goods with the parties’ interests in protecting other goods and rights potentially 
jeopardized by institutional actors’ behavior.
Norms and tactics can “score” better or worse according to the security 
standard. A  tactic with no conceivable causal connection to the end sought is 
imbued with zero justificatory weight. Some tactics are so brutal that the negative 
portion of a proportionality calculation can be assumed to outweigh any good 
done. A tactic that is efficacious only 10 percent of the time similarly fails the se-
curity standard. Such a low score on any of the criteria disqualify the tactic. In 
such a case, the state agents employing the tactic are not acting within the scope 
of their duties. A promising tactic has to be at least more efficacious and reliable 
than not (>50  percent) and must be proportionate. A  tactic is proportionate if 
the harm done does not exceed the good accomplished or preserved through the 
action. Efficiency is context- dependent and so does not lend itself to a categorical 
or scalar assessment. The efficiency element has to be compared across different 
tactics and can potentially be a significantly lower scoring element than the other 
three without disqualifying the norm or tactic.
The rights- respecting element of the security standard is weighted greater than 
the combined practical elements, so a tactic that is reasonably successful in the prac-
tical sense can be excluded if it infringes on rights to a great degree. The basic calcu-
lation is that people cannot be modeled as consenting to a cure that is worse than 
the disease afflicting them. These are situations where the tactics meant to protect 
rights actually harm rights to a greater degree than they were being harmed or were 
likely to be harmed when the tactics were contrived. This is obviously going to be 
an inexact comparison since one needs to consider the impact of a security- seeking 
tactic, such as compelling plane passengers to pass through metal detectors, with 
the product of the calamity hopefully forestalled (terrorist attack) multiplied by 
the likelihood of its occurring. The implication here is that a given tactic might be 
consent- worthy in one environment but not in another, as the likelihood of certain 
kinds of rights violations changes.
Given a competitive total score, a contending tactic has to be compared against 
others. A lower scoring tactic is not consent- worthy if an agency can engage in a 
better- ranking tactic. The security standard provides moral grounds for people 
to constantly press for better tactics on the part of state agents, comparing their 
state’s tactics with those used by agents of other states. State agents fail in their 
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duty if they persist in using outmoded tactics that are less practically effective or 
more rights- infringing than available alternatives.
The security standard endorses the extant phenomenon best meeting its 
criteria, giving legitimacy to security standard- compliant tactics already in use. 
Legitimate tactics are tactics expressive of state agents’ professional duties, pro-
vided that state agents engage in these tactics in an upright manner. Obviously, 
state agents using permissible tactics for non- official purposes are acting outside 
of their duty (e.g., a soldier engaging in permissible collateral killing purely out of 
bloodlust or a police officer repeatedly charging his ex- wife with picayune traffic 
offenses).
In sum, the security standard answers the question for state agents:  In what 
does my professional duty consist? State agents should use the security standard 
in assessing which norms to cultivate and which tactics to use. They should also 
constantly seek norms and tactics that are more reliable, efficacious, rights- 
respecting, etc. Legislators should hew to this standard when crafting laws meant 
to reform security agencies. The internal counsel for such agencies should inter-
pret the letter of existing laws according to the spirit of the security standard. 
The public has a duty to use this standard to oversee the protocols of state agents 
dealing with foreigners (discussed in the next section). Tactics falling short of this 
standard, given economically and technically feasible alternatives available to the 
government, can be reasonably criticized and targeted for reform.
Hypothetical consent accrues to domestic government actions aimed at 
securing a domestic environment relatively free of rights violations. These actions 
include actions by military and intelligence operators aimed at defeating external 
threats to a state’s security. There are two types of action, broadly speaking, of 
relevance to this enterprise:  investigative and strategic. Investigative actions 
(undertaken by any sort of agency) approach targets who may be security threats 
in order to determine if they are in fact threats. These targets include domestic 
and international criminal suspects, foreigners who might have information 
of national security interest but who are not clearly identified members of for-
eign security agencies, and foreign civilians who may be irregular militants (e.g., 
insurgents, international jihadists). Strategic actions are actions taken against 
known adversaries such as foreign service members, intelligence officers, and 
clearly identified irregular militants. Strategic actions lack the tentativeness and 
gradualness appropriate with investigative tactics as they presuppose a clearly 
identified adversary; they are oriented to getting the best of that adversary.
Since all the people in the world can be modeled as consenting to a regime 
of outward- facing security- seeking actions, model consenters’ (in one notional 
state) consent to foreign operations by their security services also potentially 
justifies action by foreign agents targeting them. This dynamic can best be 
explained by discussing its domestic parallel. Hypothetical consent is permissive 
when it comes to the justification of police tactics meant to keep model consenters 
safe. Considerations of how to secure the safety of consenters justifies a series of 
actions aimed at rights violators or potential rights violators. At the same time, 
a principle of reciprocity urges restraint of police tactics since it justifies police 
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behavior targeting the consenter if that person is suspected of perpetrating or pla-
nning rights violations. So the consent that we imagine people extending to do-
mestic security- seeking tactics takes into account that they might be the target of 
those tactics. The same reflexivity must apply to outward- facing security- seeking 
tactics.
Regarding investigative actions, model consenters of one notional state must 
use themselves as reference points, asking whether they can consent to their state 
agents using tactics abroad that, via the principle of reciprocity, they must also 
permit foreign agents to use against them. Using this approach, the rule of thumb 
should be that security agencies should use the same investigative tactics abroad 
that they use domestically. For example, if the security standard indicates that 
warrants are necessary for a security service to intercept a domestic inhabitant’s 
communications or that a domestic criminal suspect has to be warned about a 
right to remain silent in police interrogation, the same treatment should apply to a 
foreigner targeted by the security service. There might be exceptions if the foreign 
target is significantly different than a domestic one or if it is not feasible to extend 
the same treatment to foreigners as to domestic inhabitants. As examples of the 
former type of difference, the sophisticated encryption technology foreign intelli-
gence officers use might prompt different monitoring tactics than appropriate for 
domestic criminal suspects. As an example of the latter kind of difference, certain 
types of up- close, manpower- intensive surveillance feasible for a domestic secu-
rity agency might not be feasible in an adversary state. In this case, an intelligence 
agency might want to opt for satellite or drone surveillance— a tactic that might 
be more privacy- infringing since it permits seeing over walls shielding targets 
from street- level surveillance. If this more privacy- infringing tactic is consent- 
worthy under the security standard, the model consenter potentially permits her 
adversary’s security agencies to do the same in her country.
The approach outlined here creates a universal norm for security operations. 
Foreign security agencies can be criticized for failing to meet the security standard 
when it is in their power to meet it. An example would be if an intelligence agency 
bugs the room of every foreign tourist, even though it is capable of targeting select 
foreigners of intelligence value. Regarding a similar concern, one might wonder 
if state agents should not adhere to local standards of security operations when 
operating abroad. This concern might seem particularly germane in cases when it 
appears expedient to treat foreign combatants or intelligence targets in a less def-
erential manner than domestic criminal suspects and the adversary state (where 
operations will occur) already treats its own people roughly. yet one obviously 
does not want one’s state agents using less reliable or less efficacious tactics (e.g., 
such as torture) abroad even if they are in a foreign state whose own security 
forces use less reliable and efficacious tactics. While one would want one’s state 
agents to emulate foreign practices better than their own when operating abroad, 
practical limitations may make this impossible.
Regarding strategic actions aimed at state agents, we conceive model consenters 
are first as civilian benefitees of military and intelligence agency protection. The prin-
ciple of reciprocity dictates that foreigners can benefit from the same protections, 
so model consenters consent to outward- facing strategic actions by their military 
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and intelligence personnel aimed at foreign state agents, with two limitations. First, 
military and intelligence tactics are only consent- worthy from the perspective of 
civilians if they can consent to being collaterally harmed by them when those tactics 
are targeted at their own state agents. Thus in a military context, tactics imposing 
a certain level of risk on foreign civilians are only consent- worthy if consenters 
can consent to the risk of being collaterally harmed when foreign militaries use 
the same tactics in operations in the consenters’ homeland. So, for example, the 
security standard endorses the traditional tenets of jus in bello— just warfighting. 
Tactics must discriminate between military and nonmilitary targets, and not cause 
more damage than is warranted by the military value of a target. If people of one 
notional state can be modeled as consenting to other states’ militaries deploying 
to war to defend their domestic inhabitants, even if the consenters’ own state is the 
unjust aggressor, they would not consent to foreign tactics pursuing a just cause 
in an unnecessarily destructive manner, targeting civilians or causing more civilian 
casualties than are proportionally offset by the good of achieving tactical goals. 
(Proportionality is an optimal rule integrating two imperatives permitting both 
sides to pursue important tactical goals while minimizing collateral damage.)
This modeling exercise suffices to limit military and intelligence operations 
insofar as they affect noncombatants. One would also need to model hypothet-
ical consent from the perspective of a military or intelligence professional in 
order to determine the limits of military and intelligence operations insofar as 
they affect state agents. This follows because state agents properly direct strategic 
actions at other state agents. In some cases, overlapping justifications would yield 
the same limitations as the noncombatant- based consent exercise. For example, 
noncombatants cannot be modeled as consenting to being directly targeted in 
military operations since such actions violate their rights12 and service personnel 
cannot be modeled as consenting to directly targeting civilians because such 
targeting is neither a reliable nor efficient means of achieving a military victory 
(e.g., killing civilians instead of enemy service personnel leaves the enemy’s mili-
tary capacity intact). There would also be tactics failing the security standard that 
can only be modeled from a service member’s perspective only germane to him, 
such as tactics using chemical weapons or napalm against massed infantry. I will 
not pursue service personnel- based consent- modeling further here.13
In all, the security standard prompts a cautious approach, particularly with re-
spect to foreign operations, because a wide range of concrete practices could be jus-
tified if the security standard permits security services to conduct foreign operations 
employing the most reliable, efficient, rights- respecting, etc. tactics available to the 
service. The best locally available tactics justified by the security service will vary 
depending on a given state’s wealth, size, technological prowess, and ingenuity. If the 
standard then effectively permits all security actors to “do their best,” the standard 
12. I am condensing a long argument here. Noncombatants’ rights are violated because direct 
targeting of them fails the security standard.
13. I develop the security standard and its associated military norms in much greater detail in 
 chapter 8 of the forthcoming The Moral Status of Combatants.
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allows situations in which, for example, wealthy country A’s intelligence services 
conduct very discriminate, sophisticated, targeted, and automated intercepts of for-
eign intelligence target’s communications— so that very few innocent people have 
their privacy violated— while also permitting poor country B’s intelligence services 
to conduct relatively crude, indiscriminate intercepts that violate the privacy of far 
more innocent people. So too in the case of war: the military of wealthy country 
A may cause far less collateral damage with precision munitions than the military of 
country B, despite the fact that B’s military is trying just as hard to be discriminate 
and proportional. Thus, before engaging in a tactic promising a degree of collat-
eral damage, an agency needs to consider if the inhabitants of its own state can be 
modeled as tolerating the levels of collateral damage associated with its adversary’s 
reciprocal response. It could follow that that peer or near- peer adversaries might 
be permitted tactics a powerful state is not permitted when fighting a much weaker 
adversary.
II.  IS PUBLIC SCRUTINY OF SECURITY OPER ATIONS 
APPROPRIATE?
A. Dynamics of Oversight
Having articulated a moral standard for judging the operations of security oper-
ations, it is next important to consider the implementation of this standard. Is it 
enough for security operators to self- regulate according to the security standard 
or for their agencies to self- regulate through the actions of internal auditors, such 
as staff lawyers and inspectors general? Or must the public conduct oversight of 
these operations in order to ensure compliance with the security standard, or at 
least conduct oversight of the internal protocols and legal findings setting the 
parameters for operations?
In order to answer these questions, it is first important to clarify the practical 
dynamics of oversight relative to consent. It is a less pressing matter to assign and 
specify a duty of oversight as a distinct activity in cases of explicit consent when 
consent immediately precedes the contracted activity, such as the purchasing of 
an item at a store. It is also less pressing when consent is tacitly given throughout 
the duration of the relevant activity, since consent can be revoked at any time (by 
explicitly objecting), such as in the provision of a service involving the client’s 
participation or active enjoyment such as an out- patient medical procedure, mas-
sage, or haircut, or in some consensual activity such as gameplay, debate, sex, etc. 
In these cases, oversight of the service provider’s or activity partner’s activities 
by a concrete, particular consenter is simultaneous or nearly simultaneous with 
consent to the activity. By contrast, hypothetical consent only creates abstract 
standards; compliance with standards has to be conducted empirically. In that 
case, concrete, particular individuals can and should offer their explicit consent to 
consent- worthy activities or explicitly dissent to activity failing this standard. So, 
from a practical perspective, government transparency is important since there is 
usually a lag between the execution of a putatively consent- worthy governmental 
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action and the effect on an inhabitant or foreigner. There will also be a significant 
number of people unaffected by government actions targeted at others. These 
temporal and participatory gaps inhibit real- time oversight concurrent with on-
going tacit consent. Therefore, just from a practical point of view, government 
transparency about its operations and post hoc review by some competent parties 
would be necessary to ensure compliance with the security standard. I will argue 
that this transparency— and the public oversight that comes with it— is not nec-
essary to legitimize government programs but necessary to ensure that personnel 
in politically legitimate programs do not become corrupt or incompetent.
The legitimacy of national security actions comes from consent- worthiness 
in my theory, rather than the explicit consent of a state’s inhabitants or citizens 
or openness to publicity. Explicit consent is not the source of legitimacy de-
spite playing a paradigmatic role in social contract theory. Early social contract 
thinkers appealed to the notion of the consent of the governed to explain how 
a government’s freedom- impinging actions could be consistent with citizens’ 
freedom, despite the difficulty in explaining exactly how citizens or inhabitants 
transfer their consent to government officials. There are few opportunities for un-
ambiguous explicit consent to government policies, and even the best candidates, 
such as oaths of citizenship or votes in referenda, prompt questions about the 
scope of consent and implications of being in the voting minority. Further, the 
popularity of a government policy does not necessarily have anything to do 
with its morality.14 Therefore, if government transparency is necessary for the 
14.  The best (i.e., least ambiguous) candidates for expressing consent are ones that rarely occur. 
Signing a new Constitution, swearing an oath to one, or voting for one in a referendum are suggested 
as paradigmatic instances of consent to a government invoked in the classic notion of the social con-
tract ( John Locke, Second Treatise on Government § 89; Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 17; Michael 
Walzer, Obligations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), xi). The obvious difficulty is 
that such events have not often occurred in recorded history (David Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” 
in Moral and Political Philosophy, ed. Henry Aiken (New york: Hafner Press, 1948), 356– 372, 362), 
and probably none have occurred with unanimous consent— a criterion the early contract theorists 
demanded (A. John Simmons, Moral Principle and Political Obligation (Princeton, NJ:  University 
Press, 1979), 72). Further, it is not clear how being bound to one’s ancestors’ oaths or votes is con-
sonant with the autonomy the doctrine of consent is meant to safeguard (Hume, 360). Immigrating 
and taking oaths of citizenship or naturalization would seem to express explicit consent (Harry Beran, 
“In Defense of the Consent Theory of Political Obligation and Authority,” Ethics 87.3 (1977): 260– 
271, 262; C.W. Cassinelli, “The ‘Consent’ of the Governed,” The Western Political Quarterly 12.2 
(1959): 399; Walzer, xi), but most inhabitants of a country are born there and never participate in 
such events (Cassinelli, 398; Rawls, 13; M.B.E. Smith, “Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the 
Law?,” Yale Law Journal 82 (1972– 1973): 950– 976, 960). Ritualistic performances such as swearing 
allegiance encounter difficulties of motivation, vagueness, and scope. Compulsory performance of 
such rituals cannot express genuine consent. If swearing allegiance is not compulsory, what sort of 
political obligation accrues to non- swearers? If the performance is voluntary, the ritualistic nature 
of the performance militates against the likelihood that participants grasp the contractual import of 
their mantras. Further, is one swearing allegiance to a particular leader, a system, or a particular canon 
of laws? If allegiance is sworn to the third item, this further argues against the prospect that consent is 
knowing, given the size and complexity of a canon of laws (Cassinelli, 402).
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legitimacy of government programs, it is not on account of legitimacy stemming 
from inhabitants’ explicit consent.
Let us now turn to the openness to publicity standard. This standard of po-
litical legitimacy would reject any policy that could not be revealed without de-
stroying its efficacy. Many contemporary exponents of the standard draw from 
Immanuel Kant’s signal articulation of the idea in To Perpetual Peace. Kant argues 
that “all actions that affect the rights of other men are wrong if their maxim is not 
consistent with publicity.”15 He means that an action is immoral if the general rule 
guiding the action cannot be known by all without that widespread knowledge 
making the execution of the action impossible. Performing the action would be 
impossible because the action’s success inherently depends on the maxim (the 
general rule guiding the action) remaining covert in the way that a lie’s success 
depends on its remaining covert or because it would necessarily create universal 
opposition in the manner of a person’s announcement of his policy of murdering 
anyone he dislikes. Laws compliant with this publicity standard must be acces-
sible to inhabitants, that is. they could actually go to a library or the internet and 
read the statute. An attendant feature of permissible positive law is that the law 
would not necessarily create opposition once it was studied.
Policies need to be open to oversight on this line of thinking in order to meet 
the conditions for citizens’ consent (they do not actually need to meet with their 
consent, for the reasons already articulated). Concealed policies are not even 
candidates for political legitimacy because of an absence of the conditions nec-
essary for citizen endorsement of the actions— even if the law would have been 
popular.16 By way of analogy, a man wrongs a woman if he has intercourse with 
her while she is too drunk to give informed consent, even if she would have 
given her consent if sober. David Luban convincingly argues that Kant’s open-
ness to publicity principle17 does not preclude all forms of secrecy. “First- order 
secrets” cannot be revealed without frustrating the action or identity the se-
cret is meant to conceal, for example, “John Smith is actually an undercover of-
ficer.” However, “second- order secrets”— secrets about secrets— can be revealed 
without destroying the relevant first- order secret. “The police department utilizes 
undercover officers” can be publicly disclosed without jeopardizing undercover 
operations and without creating necessary public opposition. It therefore passes 
Kant’s openness to publicity principle.18 Since the second- order secret passes 
the principle, the related first order secret may be permissibly concealed on 
15. Immanuel Kant, “To Perpetual Peace,” appendix II, [381] 135, ed. Humphrey.
16. David E. Pozen sympathetically outlines this view, “Deep Secrecy,” 62 Stanford Law Review 
257 (2010): 286.
17. I will use the term “openness to publicity” to express the political application of the publicity 
principle. The broader publicity principle embedded in the Categorical Imperative captures an 
aspect of the possible universalization morally sound maxims display: they can still be effica-
cious even if universally known.
18.  David Luban, “The Publicity Principle,” The Theory of Institutional Design, ed. Robert E. 
Goodin, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 154– 198, 191.
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Kantian grounds. However, a relevant third order secret such as “the government 
will keep all police activities secret” cannot be revealed without creating public 
opposition— since this gives the government unchecked power19 and abnegates 
duties of inhabitants described below.20
I do not find this reading of the openness to publicity standard compelling in 
all cases because I can think of (and will discuss below) intuitively permissible 
security- seeking tactics that lose their efficacy if the fact of their use is revealed. 
These are second- order secrets that need to remain secret in order to be effective. 
The security standard can justify their use. All this will be defended further below, 
but for the sake of argument now we will entertain the possibility that the exist-
ence of some government programs is legitimately kept secret. However, since the 
personnel assigned to a program are vulnerable to groupthink, blind- spots, cor-
ruption, nepotism, and perverse incentives, proper guidance of these programs 
can only be promoted with external oversight of some sort. Thus, I will proceed 
below, taking a practical view of the openness to publicity standard as the relevant 
rationale for public oversight. On that view, external oversight or the possibility of 
external oversight is not constitutive of a program’s legitimacy, but important in 
order to ensure that legitimate programs do not become corrupt. Section III will 
address the obvious tension between the need to oversee a program that cannot 
persist if its existence is publicly revealed.
B. The Public’s Interest in Oversight
We can now expand on the idea that government programs practically need ex-
ternal oversight in order to ensure compliance with their moral authorizations. 
Again, government programs (inclusive of their personnel) are not self- monitoring 
and do not win real- time tacit or explicit consent from state inhabitants. Who 
should perform this oversight? The public has interests, rights, and duties rele-
vant to oversight of government security services that would be trespassed if state 
gents err, overreach, or become corrupt.
First, an inhabitant has an interest in ensuring that his own rights are not being 
violated by the government. One is obviously in a privileged, though still fallible, 
position to judge whether one is being wronged by another. Some might also 
term this interest a duty, though duties to the self— such as a duty not to be made 
servile— are less widely recognized than duties to others. This duty to the self can 
be supported by an associated duty to others in the following way. It is likely that 
the government will perform the same rights- violating actions against others if 
one does not protest the government violating one’s own rights. Thus, allowing 
the bad behavior to continue unchecked fails to protect others.
One also has a right to oversee government activities for the reason that a 
contracting party has a right to see the work he has purchased. A  taxpayer has 
19. Luban, 191.
20. Pozen refers to the concealment of second- order secrets, “deep secrets,” and regards them 
with deep distaste because the public does not even know to ask about them, Pozen, 274.
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a right to see the services he subsidized with his tax monies. The purpose of this 
type of oversight of government actions is to combat fraud and waste.21
Regarding duties, inhabitants of liberal states alienate certain powers to state 
agents to use on their behalf. Principals are morally responsible for their agents’ 
behavior when that behavior is consistent with the principals’ orders so the prin-
cipal has a duty to ensure that her agent is doing things she is morally required to 
see accomplished and not doing things she herself is morally forbidden to do.22 
This applies both to direct agents, who do relatively low- skilled actions the prin-
cipal could have done herself such as gardening, babysitting, and proofreading, 
and to free agents, highly skilled actors such as lawyers or accountants the prin-
cipal relies on for their expertise and ability to make independent judgments.23 
Obviously, the moral impetus for the public to oversee state agents is greater than 
the impetus to oversee private agents because of the potential harm these free 
agents can do utilizing the powers of the state.
There are two specific duties the public has to meet when overseeing state 
agents. First, people have a collective moral responsibility to contribute to a se-
cure environment, a responsibility largely met when they contribute to the cre-
ation or sustaining of relevant state institutions.24 A  component of sustaining 
state institutions includes ensuring that state agents are indeed working to se-
cure this kind of environment.25 Second, since the coercive means state agents 
use to prevent rights violations perpetrated by state inhabitants against each 
other can themselves violate people’s rights, the public must ensure that its agents 
are pursuing the end of security in ways conforming to the security standard. In 
other words, the public has a duty to ensure that its agents pursue the moral end 
of security (creating an environment relatively free of rights violations) without 
violating deontological concerns making state security morally valuable.
21.  These points are famously made by Jeremy Bentham, discussed by Amy Gutmann and 
Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1996).
22. A principal is not responsible for something her agent did completely of his, the agent’s, own 
accord, having nothing to do with the agency transferred to him by the principal.
23.  Free agents bear a heavier burden of independent moral responsibility than direct agents 
for electing tactics the principal does not have the training to fully understand. Practically, 
principals can usually not exercise real- time oversight of free agents because of a lack of relevant 
expertise, and so will likely focus on consequences, which are intelligible to a layperson in a 
way tactics are not. Oversight will then likely be expressed in reform efforts rather than proac-
tive guidance. For example, the average civilian, supportive of a given military operation, does 
not have the expertise to decide what weapon systems should be used in a particular attack, but 
can demand to know if some more discriminate tactics or technology is available after a large 
number of civilian casualties are incurred in an operation.
24. This might sound strange, but another example of a negative duty creating a subsidiary pos-
itive duty would be a the duty not to harm others leading to a positive duty to ensure one’s car is 
in good working order, one’s gun is securely locked, and one’s pool is fenced.
25. Other relevant positive duties include paying taxes and complying with all but egregiously 
unjust laws of any state one lives in or visits.
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Since the behavior of state agents abroad can incur responses from foreign state 
agents, it is in the public’s self- interest and consistent with their concern for their 
neighbors to oversee their agents’ behavior and object to unnecessarily provoca-
tive or otherwise immoral behavior abroad. Assuming that behavior abroad po-
tentially creates a reasonable foundation for in- kind foreign responses, the public 
should object to practices that exceed the security standard marking what they 
would tolerate being done to themselves. This limitation has to be considered in 
kind rather than degree, given that a certain kind of operation releases the ad-
versary government from engaging in the same kind of operations even if they 
can only perform it in a cruder fashion than the first government. Thus, for ex-
ample, the public should object to their security agencies intercepting foreign 
civilians’ private communications electronically if they are unwilling to coun-
tenance less- sophisticated foreign agencies doing the same to them by steaming 
open envelopes.
III.  IS THE PUBLIC COMPETENT TO OVERSEE  
SECURITY OPER ATIONS?
The public has a duty to oversee state agents, yet may not be competent to execute 
this duty. Usually, duties imply the duty- holder’s power to perform the duty but 
this is not always the case. For example, one may find it hard to observe the duty 
not to unjustly harm others when operating a new vehicle or tool and learning too 
late that it is difficult to control.
In many cases, the general public is not competent to technically assess the in-
ternal protocols of security agencies. One would often need as much knowledge 
as an expert practitioner to know if a weapon system, a computer code, or inter-
rogation technique is the most reliable, efficacious, proportionate, efficient, and 
rights- respecting available. However, the general public is competent to assess 
whether the effects of a given tactic raise moral concerns. For example, the public 
does not know if stopping and frisking random young men in high crime areas is 
really the most efficient or reliable method of inhibiting gang violence, but does 
know that this tactic is disruptive to neighborhood life and offensive to innocent 
people accosted by police. This concern is enough to begin a conversation with 
state agents about whether this tactic really is the best available, and if so, whether 
the good done is really worth the harm.
In order to assess the actions of state agents, the public needs a good under-
standing of not only the actions of state agents but of the threats the agents’ oper-
ations are designed to meet.26 For example, one cannot assess the proportionality 
of a response unless one understands the danger being faced. Concerns related 
to the public’s knowledge of state agents’ operations will be addressed in Section 
IV. The public’s being informed about the threats security agencies are trying to 
meet creates a different problem, particularly in the international arena. In some 
26. William E. Colby, “Intelligence Secrecy and Security in a Free Society,” International Security 
1.2 (1976): 3– 14, 9.
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cases, a detailed picture exposes sources and methods of intelligence gathering 
to the state’s adversaries.27 The adversary can learn about the threat- publishing 
state’s technological capacities such as its satellite or other aerial reconnaissance 
resources (and flight paths), based on the imagery released, and its signal inter-
cept (SIGINT) capacities, based on the electronic communications released. 
This knowledge both helps the adversary prepare to destroy or jam those assets 
in case of war and helps the adversary hide the strategic assets that have been 
shown to be vulnerable. More dangerous still, is the direct threat posed to un-
dercover operatives or their intelligence assets who are the sources of the sensi-
tive information describing the foreign threat. There will be sensitive programs in 
the adversary state’s defense and intelligence apparatus known only to a few, and 
the process of elimination conducted by counterintelligence agents when such 
programs are compromised can be brutal and swift.
So there will be times when a government would need to describe a threat in 
order to justify expenditures or operations at a level of specificity it cannot use 
without jeopardizing sources and methods of intelligence collection.28 These are 
moments of irreducible tension between the need for oversight and the security 
aims civilian oversight is meant to secure. A government’s concealment of a sen-
sitive threat assessment amounts to a third- order secret: a secret policy justifying 
keeping secret a program encompassing secret operations. Again, Luban does not 
think concealing third- order secrets can be justified as it gives unchecked power 
to officials.29 I recognize the risk in permitting third- order secrets, but think ex-
ternal oversight should be omitted in this case where oversight meant to check 
compliance with a standard threatens to contravene the goals of that standard. 
My reasoning follows below. By way of analogy, extensive standardized testing 
of students should be curtailed if it gets in the way of their education. Again, 
according to my theory of political legitimacy, lack of oversight does not inher-
ently nullify legitimacy. Lack of oversight is a practical, rather than a constitutive, 
problem in that it creates risk of corruption.30
Whether the keeping of these kinds of third- order secrets— the revelation of 
which would compromise important security standard compliant operations— is 
itself in keeping with the security standard is difficult to assess. Keeping these 
secrets is obviously an efficacious and reliable way of preserving operations that 
would be compromised by publicity. Efficiency seems to be a non- applicable var-
iable. Proportionality is hard to assess given all the relevant unknown variables. 
27. Thompson notes this possibility in Dennis Thompson, “Democratic Secrecy,” 114 Political 
Science Quarterly (1999): 186.
28. Thompson, 182.
29. Luban, 191.
30.  I  think the security value of these secrets outweigh the Millian values Gutmann and 
Thompson argue are associated with public debate about government actions: the promotion of 
political cooperation in the face of disagreement that comes from the possibility of consenting 
to governmental actions, the promotion of citizens’ moral perspectives, the extension of respect 
between disagreeing citizens, and the self- correcting nature of deliberation, 100– 101.
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Keeping the secrets is not obviously disproportionate, comparing the benefits 
promised by the program with the disvalues of omitting the truth to the public 
and running risks of corruption.
Regarding the rights- respecting element of the security standard, the public 
generally has a right to know what its government is doing in its name and so any 
kind of government secret would seem at first prejudicial to the public’s rights. 
This right to know is relevant to the protection of other rights since government 
programs failing the security standard may be abusing more substantive rights 
among the people affected. yet clearly, there are limits to the public’s right to 
know. The public does not have a right to know personal information about gov-
ernment employees such as their medical histories or financial details (with the 
possible exception of top elected officials). The public does not have the right to 
know first- order secrets that will endanger state agents. State agents have an in-
stitutional right linked to their professional roles to be spared from unnecessary 
or frivolous endangerment by their own governments. Their rights trump the 
public’s general right to know about government programs when it comes to par-
ticular agents’ involvement in the program. yet we cannot simply conclude that 
it does not wrong the public to conceal third- order secrets in order to protect the 
agents involved because the program may be doing the public such a disservice 
due to its practical inefficacy and disregard for human rights that a proportion-
ality calculation indicates that the good done by exposing the program outweighs 
the disvalue of exposing agents to harm. To be clear, this is probably a rare case 
where the mere revelation that a particular type of program exists would expose 
agents to risk (whereas usually, second- order secrets such as “the police use under-
cover officers in counter- narcotics operations” can be revealed without exposing 
particular agents to undue danger).
If the program is security standard- compliant, then the security standard 
indicates that its existence can be permissibly concealed because of the risk to the 
state agents involved. Ideally, if responsible members of government recognize 
that the program is a failure, they will pull their agents from the field, halt the 
program, and announce to the public what went wrong. Failing official measures, 
a whistleblower would ideally alert field agents before revealing the program or 
only reveal the program if agents were not currently deployed, counting on the 
government’s subsequent protection of the agents from possible foreign reprisals. 
Failing all those ideal scenarios, a whistleblower may reveal the program to the 
detriment of field agents if the proportionality calculation is strongly in favor of 
revelation.31
The other justification for concealing third- order secrets is that revelation 
would lead the adversary to close otherwise fruitful intelligence- gathering 
channels. I  have argued that the purpose of publicizing government programs 
generally is to give the public an opportunity to verify that the programs are 
31. In particularly odious programs, agents’ right not to be endangered may be offset by their 
culpability in immoral actions they should have known were immoral and inefficacious, for ex-
ample, torture.
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security standard- compliant. Advocates for the concealment of third- order 
secrets regarding security standard- compliant programs are effectively holding 
that the government should be trusted with designing security- seeking programs 
and then unilaterally determining whether their existence should be concealed. 
Skeptics worry that all programs need to be publicized (even while keeping tac-
tical applications secret) in order to avoid corruption. Roughly, it seems that con-
cealment of third- order secrets violates the rights of the public if the program is 
being corruptly run but does not violate their rights if concealment facilitates a 
vital and properly run national security program. Revelation of the latter type 
of program would in fact fail the government’s duty to protect the public. The 
problem, of course, is that secrecy prevents the public from knowing which situ-
ation obtains. We need some kind of publicly available data to use to model the 
consent of all affected parties to the concealment of third- order secrets. I  will 
tentatively conclude that concealment of third- order secrets passes the rights- 
respecting element of the security standard if there are significant national se-
curity threats facing the state. We can model all affected parties as agreeing ex 
ante to a premise permitting a state facing significant national security threats 
to engage in third- order secret keeping— effectively, to engage in secret govern-
ment deliberations about which programs to initiate based (ideally) on the secu-
rity standard and which programs will have to be concealed from the public.32 
Barring a clear, present, and significant danger, it may well be too risky to give a 
government the power to conceal third- order secrets.
If we go down this road, the government’s knowledge of certain threats will 
have to be kept secret, as will the intelligence- gathering operations meant to assess 
the threats; and the contingency plans developed to meet them. The expenditures 
on personnel and equipment designed to counter the threat would also have to 
be kept secret if their nature is so specific as to tip the hand to the adversary, for 
example, if country A buys chemical- resistant suits for all its service personnel, 
adversary country B will realize that its secret chemical weapons program has 
been exposed.
State agents have to operate on their own recognizance in cases where third- 
order secrets are legitimate. This situation does open the door to corruption and 
abuse and so necessitates the careful vetting and training of recruits to secu-
rity agencies. Disclosures of sensitive threat assessments and secret operations 
would be indicated by the security standard if corruption and incompetence 
hindered state agents from actually securing their state.33 An imperfect compro-
mise designed to mitigate the tension between security and oversight would be 
to have an oversight body of legislators assigned to the agency who themselves 
32. This consent extends to targets of intelligence collection, who can be modeled as consenting 
to their own government engaging in reciprocal intelligence collection and secret- keeping.
33.  This argument creates a standard for whistle- blowing. Revealing threat assessments or 
programs whose efficacy depends on secrecy is not appropriate, but revealing gross abuses by 
state agents in the prosecution of these programs may be appropriate, provided one meets some 
criteria similar to those appropriate for civil disobedience.
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were sworn to secrecy. This option is imperfect because overseers committed to 
secrecy have no legal way of alerting the public or their colleagues outside of the 
select committee if the security services ignore their concerns and the wider leg-
islature does not act on their necessarily vague, unclassified recommendations.34
IV.  WHICH GOVERNMENT PROGR AMS ARE PROPERLY  
K EPT SECRET?
Section III broached the key question of this chapter:  what types of govern-
ment actions are properly classified and kept out of public view? We now have 
a formal answer implied by the foregoing discussion of threat assessments. 
Operations, expenditures, recruitments, protocols, internal legal rulings, and 
threat assessments meeting the security standard but which cannot be revealed 
without jeopardizing the relevant operations should be classified. This section 
will specify the programs meeting this criterion. A  surprising number of mili-
tary and intelligence operations can be revealed to the public, at least at a certain 
level of generality, without harm to national security. In order to make substan-
tive recommendations about what sort of secrets should be classified, I will con-
sider five typical activities of intelligence agencies and three typical activities of 
the military. I will assume that some tactics within these categories can meet the 
security standard without working out specific justifications. Analysis of concrete 
activities will produce five stock rationales arguing for, or against, secrecy.
SIGINT— the key question to consider when judging security operations is 
whether disclosure of government actions will directly or indirectly endanger 
state agents or civilians and whether disclosure will lead adversaries to cease ac-
tivities from which the government is currently garnering useful intelligence. 
Cyberespionage is consistent with public disclosure at a certain level of gener-
ality (i.e., second- order revelations). It can be revealed that state agents attempt to 
collect classified information from adversaries’ computer networks and even that 
a particular foreign agency is targeted. This follows, because, in the digital age, 
every technologically- sophisticated state assumes its adversaries are attempting 
cyberespionage and every such state is engaged in cyber defenses including en-
cryption, information assurance activities, and intrusion and malware detection. 
I will call this assumption that the adversary is already engaged in defensive op-
erations the Defense argument. First- order disclosures that would compromise 
a specific operation should remain secret, for example, “agents posing as defense 
contractors plan to use zip drives infected with the XyZ virus to install a back 
door in the Quds Force network this July.”
Secrecy is appropriate with respect to more traditional SIGINT involving the 
collection of communications via the interception of various kinds of microwave 
and other electromagnetic transmissions. Disclosure of a state’s ability to cap-
ture certain kinds of transmissions can lead to their enemy halting usage of that 
technology, such as al- Qaeda’s alleged halting of satellite phone communications 
34. Pozen makes a similar point, 332.
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after the media revealed that US agencies could monitor the calls and also use 
their signatures for targeting purposes in 1998.35 I will call the adversary’s aban-
donment of tactics in reaction to its enemy’s abilities the Avoidance argument. 
This is a key example of a program that I believe passes (or could pass)36 the se-
curity standard but the existence of which must be concealed lest the purpose of 
the security standard not be met. Revelation of the second- order secret that the 
United States is intercepting al- Qaeda satellite phone calls makes the program 
inefficacious. This is the case even if the adversary has no choice but to use the 
form of communication in question, because they will presumably communicate 
less than they would have otherwise. The need for secrecy is mitigated to a degree 
if the intercept capability is understood to be less than comprehensive such that 
the adversary can wager that there is a reasonable chance that his communication 
will slip through the collector’s net (call this the Randomness argument). Once 
it is widely known that an agency can collect a certain kind of communication 
signal, secrecy is still appropriate regarding operations collecting transmissions 
from particular targets. Al- Qaeda closed down a communication channel after it 
was leaked that NSA monitoring had led to an intercepted order from Aymin al- 
Zawahiri to al- Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula leader Nasser al- Wuhayshi to at-
tack US embassies in the Middle East.37 It should also be noted that while SIGINT 
raises privacy concerns, the elimination of SIGINT as an intelligence source 
forces agencies to rely more on human intelligence (HUMINT). HUMINT is 
far more fraught than SIGINT in that it involves the penetration of undercover 
agents into enemy territory, the corruption of foreign intelligence assets, the ena-
bling and financial support of criminals, and the interrogation of detainees.
HUMINT— the most traditional occupation of intelligence officers is 
“turning” intelligence assets, that is, convincing members of adversary states 
with access to security- sensitive information to reveal the information. Secrecy 
about HUMINT operations is unnecessary on a general level because of the 
Defense and Randomness arguments. Publicly revealing that undercover intel-
ligence officers from state A are attempting to turn assets in state B tells state B 
nothing it did not already assume and was not already attempting to root out with 
its own counterintelligence operations. Secrecy should be maintained with re-
spect to specific operations along the lines of “an intelligence officer posing as the 
Agricultural minister from country A is attempting to turn Gen. X in the Strategic 
Air Command.” Obviously, both the undercover agent and the prospective intel-
ligence asset are endangered by disclosure. Assuming that the undercover agent is 
35.  Whether the leak directly led to al- Qaeda’s change in procedure is contested. Cf. “Bush 
Account of a Leak’s Impact Has Support,” David E. Rosenbaum, nytimes.com, publ. December 
20, 2005 and “File the Bin Laden Phone Leak Under ‘Urban Myths,’ ” Glenn Kessler, 
washingtonpost.com, publ. December 22, 2005.
36. As noted in Section III, a civilian has a limited ability to assess whether a given operation 
has better available tactical alternatives.
37. “Qaeda Plot Leak Has Undermined U.S. Intelligence” Eric Schmidt and Michael Schmidt, 
newyorktimes.com, September 29, 2013.
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conducting a just mission, his life is of moral value apart from the inherent value 
of all people; his being compromised puts his state at greater risk (this is the case 
even if he fails in his mission but is able to escape safely). I will call this the Danger 
argument.
Covert Operations— paramilitary operations conducted by undercover (i.e., 
nonuniformed) operators including assassination, incitement, and sabotage— 
bear some similarities to HUMINT operations. General disclosure that agents 
may conduct covert operations in an adversary state is permissible because of the 
Defense and Randomness arguments. Specific disclosures are forbidden because 
of the Danger and Avoidance arguments. The Danger argument would apply in 
all cases while the Avoidance argument would be particularly apt in the case of 
sabotage, such as when state A ensures that the rare components for some weapon 
system or computer network procured by the adversary security services are de-
fective or contain listening devices or malware. The adversary would know not to 
install the components if the plan was disclosed.
Interrogation— there is an argument to keep interrogation tactics secret be-
cause adversary agents may be able to prepare for them, thus reducing their ef-
fectiveness. This argument is more germane for non- coercive stratagems than 
coercive tactics (which do not pass the security standard anyway). It would be 
useful for security agents or irregular militants to know that interrogators of 
their adversary typically engage in certain kinds of emotional manipulation, for 
example, playing on detainees’ fears, sense of loyalty, resentments, etc., or that 
interrogators offer fake incentives, for example, promises to assist detainees’ 
family members or to forgo sentences in exchange for information. However, the 
Defense and Randomness arguments suggest that disclosure is not overly prob-
lematic. Knowing that adversary interrogators might play on detainees’ concern 
for their families or comrades does not eliminate the fact that detainees will be 
concerned for their families and comrades. Given that emotional backdrop, even 
the savvy detainee who is dubious of the interrogator’s attempts at rapproche-
ment might seize on the possibility that this interrogator is telling the truth about 
helping family members or minimizing the suffering of comrades.
Cryptography— the fact that a security agency tries to break its adversary’s 
codes can be revealed because of the Defense and Randomness arguments. The 
Defense argument can justify disclosure of attempts to break the encryption 
of particular networks so long as the adversary already knows that other states 
are aware of the network. For example, disclosure that agency A  is attempting 
to break the codes protecting the computer networks of its adversary’s nuclear 
facilities is permissible but not if the adversary thinks its nuclear program is still 
clandestine. As with SIGINT, specificity may lead to the adversary closing down 
networks protected by insecure encryption.
The following three subjects pertain to the military.
Battleplans— standing contingency plans can be disclosed at the level of gener-
ality where they would be obvious to potential adversaries, for example, a Russian 
tank invasion of the Fulda Gap will be met with NATO armor and air assets (the 
precise number of assets used should remain classified). There is also little incen-
tive to keep secret even less obvious plans from weaker adversaries who do not 
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lack the resources to respond to the battleplans. For example, there is no reason 
to keep secret, contingency plans to attack an adversary with stealth bombers if 
neither the enemy state nor its allies have any way of detecting these bombers (call 
this the Asymmetry argument). Otherwise, specific battle plans for imminent op-
erations must be kept secret because of the Danger argument.
In certain cases, foreign aggression can be deterred through an adversary’s am-
biguous plans for response. Chinese officials might suspect that the United States 
will not really go to war to defend Taiwan, but the possibility that the United States 
would may be sufficient to deter aggressive moves to restore Taiwan to mainland 
control. Noninterventionist plans should be kept secret in cases where deliberate 
ambiguity serves as a deterrent to hostilities. In a similar case, plans to omit recip-
rocal responses should be classified if deterrence is maintained by the adversary’s 
logical assumption that a certain action would earn a reciprocal response. For 
example, British ballistic missile submarines are said to have handwritten notes 
from the prime minister with orders of what the captain should do if Britain is 
attacked with nuclear weapons. It is appropriate to keep these instructions clas-
sified since adversaries’ reasonable assumption that British submarines would re-
taliate in case of nuclear attack serves to deter a rational adversary.38
Deterrence maintained by false, explicitly announced policies is a harder case. 
For example, in the run- up to the Gulf War, the Bush administration supposedly 
made it known to Saddam Hussein through diplomatic channels that a chemical 
attack on Coalition forces would be met with an American nuclear strike. I sus-
pect this was a false threat. There are obvious moral concerns involved with a gov-
ernment lying to its own people if a false threat is made more publicly. There is a 
considerable literature on this subject raising some of the above- mentioned issues 
regarding government secrecy, which I will not address here except to touch on a 
point relevant to the security standard. There is less impetus to disclose the truth 
about a covert false threat if the ultimate rationale for government transparency 
is to reform policies inconsistent with the security standard. This is because the 
actual policy is not inconsistent with the security standard. Whether the policy 
of making false threats to adversaries is consistent with the security standard 
depends on its prudence. While lying to an adversary may initially seem less prob-
lematic than lying to a domestic audience, false threats may increase tensions and 
make the adversary more aggressive and more entreprenurial with its intelligence 
operations. yet one can also imagine cases where lies are prudent instances of 
deterrence.
Troop movements— in cases of active hostilities, troop movements have to be 
kept secret because of the Danger argument.
Location of military assets— during peacetime, the location of strategic assets 
designed to deter a peer adversary, such as Cold War- era American and British 
ICBMs, has to be kept secret on account of the Defense argument. This argument 
also applies to any military assets in active theaters of war. The location of assets 
designed to deter or to respond to weaker adversaries often do not need to be 
38. Luban makes a similar point, 164.
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classified because of the Asymmetry argument. For example, the drone operators 
stationed at Creech Air Force base in Nevada, engaged against operations against 
the Taliban in Afghanistan, do not need to fear an enemy lacking any expedi-
tionary capabilities.
V. CONCLUSION
In liberal states, security services should seek to secure an environment relatively 
free of rights violations to inhabitants by using the most reliable, efficacious, ef-
ficient, proportionate, and rights- respecting tactics available. This standard 
undergirds just coercive actions by state agents and should guide internal reviews 
of policies and interpretation of relevant law. The public has a duty to oversee the 
activities of government security agencies in reference to the security standard. 
Nonetheless, the security standard takes precedent over oversight in cases when 
disclosure would neutralize the efficacy of security- seeking tactics. Secrecy is in-
dicated for government policies meeting the security standard when revelation 
of these policies would directly endanger state agents or indirectly jeopardize na-
tional security by drying up intelligence sources. These areas of secrecy open up 
opportunities for corruption and abuse, risks that can partly be mitigated by over-
sight from a select group of citizens (legislators, judges, perhaps even ordinary 
citizens who have security clearances). These select committees are imperfect 
solutions to the basic tension between security and secrecy because their ina-
bility to disclose their privileged information limits their ability to end immoral 
or wasteful programs when they are in the minority of their committees or when 
the security services ignore the committees’ objections. I believe this tension is 
an irreducible risk attendant to liberal societies, akin to the possibility of intol-
erant religions flourishing under a government guaranteeing freedom of religion 
or illiberal parties coming to power in a democratic process. The solution to the 
security dilemma, as in the other inherent difficulties of liberal systems, is the cul-
tivation of the virtues of citizens and public servants.
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